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The turmoil that started with increased defaults in the subprime mortgage market has generated instability
in the financial system around the world. To better understand the root causes of this financial instability,
we quantify the relative importance of various drivers behind subprime borrowers' decision to default.
In our econometric model, we allow borrowers to default either because doing so increases their lifetime
wealth or because of short-term budget constraints, treating the decision as the outcome of a bivariate
probit model with partial observability. We estimate our model using detailed loan-level data from
LoanPerformance and the Case-Shiller home price index. According to our results, one main driver
of default is the nationwide decrease in home prices. The decline in home prices caused many borrowers'
outstanding mortgage liability to exceed their home value, and for these borrowers default can increase
their wealth. Another important driver is deteriorating loan quality: The increase of borrowers with
poor credit and high payment to income ratios elevates default rates in the subprime market. We discuss
policy implications of our results. Our findings point to flaws in the securitization process that led
to the current wave of defaults. Also, we use our model to evaluate alternative policies aimed at reducing
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Subprime mortgages are made to borrowers who have a higher probability of default due to low credit
quality or risk factors associated with the loan, such as a small downpayment. The subprime market
experienced substantial growth starting in the mid- to late 1990s. The percentage of all mortgages that
were subprime grew from less than 5% in 1994 to 20% in 2005.1 Much of this growth was made possible
by an expansion in the market for private-issue mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Securitization through
MBS and related credit derivatives made it less costly to originate and fund loans that did not conform
to the underwriting standards of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, which are the chief securitizers of prime mortgages.
Beginning in late 2006, the United States subprime mortgage market experienced a sharp increase
in delinquencies and foreclosures. In the third quarter of 2005, 10.76% of all subprime mortgages were
delinquent and 3.31% were in the process of foreclosure. By comparison, the corresponding ￿gures
were 18.67% and 11.81% in the second quarter of 2008. The turmoil in the housing market has also
generated broader instability in ￿nancial markets. Because securitization transfers ownership of the
stream of mortgage payments from the originator to noteholders￿ chie￿ y other ￿nancial institutions￿
the capital structures of these other institutions became seriously impaired when the unexpected spike
in default rates caused the value of MBS to plunge. Thus, not only have subprime lenders such as New
Century Financial Corporation been forced to declare bankruptcy, but also commercial- and investment
banks have experienced substantial losses from write-downs on the value of MBS and collateralized debt
obligations. A further consequence has been the collapse of major institutions including Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers. The resulting reduction in economywide lending is linked to what many forecast
could be the worst recession since the Great Depression.
Policymakers have initiated a number of responses to the rise in defaults and worsening conditions
in credit markets. The United States government has earmarked $700 billion to fund capital injections
into ￿nancial institutions, instituted a credit facility to swap MBS for treasury securities, and placed the
previously independently operating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under conservatorship. The Federal
Reserve Board has announced a $600 billion program to purchase the direct debt of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac as well as MBS issued by the two corporations, with the goal of lowering mortgage rates and
increasing the availability of credit for housing purchases. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1Source: Moody￿ s Economy.com.
2(FDIC) has also advocated modifying mortgages to reduce monthly payments to no more than 31 percent
of borrowers￿monthly pretax income as a way to mitigate foreclosures. In addition, the banking industry
itself has led e⁄orts to stem foreclosures by modifying loan terms to make payments more a⁄ordable.
Because problems in the housing market were at the origin of this cascade of events, identifying the
underlying causes behind the recent increase in mortgage defaults is key to formulating appropriate
policy.
Financial innovations leading to the development of the subprime MBS market have been subject to
two chief criticisms. The ￿rst objection is that existing models used by the ￿nancial industry to price
subprime MBS have been too optimistic and have placed insu¢ cient weight on sources of systematic
(nondiversi￿able) risk. Although bundling individual mortgages certainly reduces idiosyncratic risk, the
pools are not immune to aggregate shocks such as nationwide declines in home prices. Through our
uni￿ed econometric framework, we analyze how subprime borrowers￿default decisions respond to home
price declines, thus providing a key input into a more accurate pricing model for securitized debt, which
in turn is necessary for capital markets to function properly.
A second concern is that the MBS market is plagued by adverse selection and agency problems.
Originators are una⁄ected by the ex post outcomes of bad mortgages that they have sold o⁄but generate
income by o› oading them. As a result, securitization gives lenders a stronger incentive to issue risky
loans, to the extent that certain markers of risk are unobserved to other market participants. Thus,
￿nancial innovation may in equilibrium lead to lower lending standards, causing the composition of
borrowers receiving loans to shift over time toward riskier types. Understanding the drivers of default
based on commonly observed characteristics is an initial step toward determining the magnitude of such
agency problems, and our analysis allows us to quantify the impact of changes in borrower composition
on default rates.
In this paper, we explore four potential explanations for the increase in mortgage defaults. Our
analysis uses a unique data set from LoanPerformance that tracks the universe of subprime and Alt-
A mortgages that were securitized between 2000 and 2007. The unit of observation is an individual
mortgage observed at a point in time. At the loan level, we observe information from the borrower￿ s loan
application, including the term of the loan, the initial interest rate, interest rate adjustments, the level
of documentation, the appraised value of the property, the loan-to-value ratio, and the borrower￿ s FICO
score at the time of origination. We also observe the month-by-month stream of payments made by the
3borrower as well as whether the mortgage goes into default. We merge the LoanPerformance data with
the Case-Shiller home price indices in 20 major U.S. cities. The merge allows us to track the current
value of a home, by in￿ ating the original appraisal value by the applicable disaggregated price index.
One potential explanation for the rise in defaults is falling home prices. Consider a frictionless world
in which there are no transaction costs from selling a home and no penalties for defaulting on a mortgage
(including any limits on the household￿ s ability to immediately buy back the same house or a similar one).
If the current market value of the home is less than the outstanding mortgage balance, it is optimal for the
borrower to default. In the literature, the option to default is referred to as the put-option component
of the mortgage (see Crawford and Rosenblatt, 1995; Deng, Quigley, and van Order, 2000; Foster and
van Order, 1985; Quigley and van Order, 1995; Vandell, 1993).
A second explanation is changes in expectations about home prices. In a world in which agents have
dynamic incentives, expectations about home price appreciation a⁄ect the value of keeping a mortgage
alive, and therefore in￿ uence the default decision. When home prices are expected to appreciate rapidly,
borrowers have a reduced incentive to default, because default would entail forgoing the capital gains
from the increased value of the home.
A third potential explanation attributes the observed rise in defaults to increases in contract interest
rates relative to market rates, particularly for adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). When the contract
interest rate is less than the current market rate, the incentive to default is lower because a borrower who
defaults would lose access to the discounted interest rate. Conversely, when the contract interest rate
rises relative to the market rate, the incentive to default increases.
In addition to these ￿nancial incentives for default, increased defaults may also be due to short-term
liquidity constraints on households. Borrowers who select into subprime loans are presumably more
likely than other types of borrowers to be unable to make their monthly payments, due to insu¢ cient
income and lack of access to other forms of credit. Moreover, when interest rates reset for adjustable-rate
mortgages, monthly mortgage payments can rise by large amounts and make it di¢ cult for borrowers to
meet their monthly debt obligations.
We build an econometric model that nests these four possibilities and thereby permits us to quan-
tify the relative importance of each factor. The dependent variable in the model is the decision to
default. Households act as utility maximizers and default if either the expected utility from contin-
4uing to make mortgage payments falls below the utility from defaulting or if the household becomes
liquidity-constrained. The former comparison is based on an equation that depends on home prices,
expectations about future home prices, and the interest rate environment. We also include a second
equation capturing the borrower￿ s ability to continue making payments on the mortgage, in order to allow
for the possibility of default due to liquidity constraints. We show that our structural equations can be
speci￿ed as a bivariate probit model with partial observability, whose general features were ￿rst studied
by Poirier (1980). As robustness checks, we also estimate two alternative speci￿cations: a competing
hazards model with unobserved borrower heterogeneity￿ similar to the approach in Deng, Quigley, and
van Order (2000)￿ as well as a univariate probit model.
We ￿nd evidence for each of the hypothesized factors in explaining default by subprime mortgage
borrowers. In particular, our results suggest that declining house prices and borrower and loan charac-
teristics a⁄ecting borrowers￿ability to pay are the two most important factors in predicting default. The
e⁄ect of declining home prices on default is substantial. For a hypothetical borrower who purchased a
home one year earlier with a 30-year ￿xed-rate mortgage and no downpayment, a 20% decline in home
price makes the borrower 15.38% more likely to default than an otherwise identical borrower whose home
price remained stable. However, liquidity constraints are as empirically important a driver as declining
house prices, and the recent increase in subprime defaults is closely linked to changes over time in the
composition of mortgage recipients. In particular, elevated default rates in the subprime market are to a
large extent driven by the worsening credit quality of subprime borrowers, as indicated by higher numbers
of borrowers who provide little or low documentation in their loan applications, have low FICO scores,
make only small downpayments, or have multiple liens on their properties. Although less important,
the increasing prevalence of adjustable-rate mortgages also contributed somewhat to rising foreclosures.
Periodic resets for ARMs sometimes resulted in large increases in required monthly payments, forcing
liquidity-constrained borrowers to default.
There is a wealth of literature examining various aspects of mortgage borrowers￿decision to default.
One strand of research has focused on the put-option nature of default by studying how net equity or
home prices a⁄ect default rates (Deng, Quigley, and van Order, 2000; Foote, Gerardi, and Willen, 2008a;
Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen, 2008). Other studies have examined the importance of liquidity constraints
and the ability of borrowers to pay, as measured by their credit quality (Archer, Ling, and McGill, 1996;
Carranza and Estrada, 2007; Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2008), as well as the role of rate resets for
adjustable-rate mortgages (Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2006).
5We build on the literature by considering each of the factors proposed by the above researchers.
However, our analysis di⁄ers from the previous literature in at least four respects. First, our econometric
model nests the various potential incentives for default inside a uni￿ed framework. In particular, we
depart from the previous literature by allowing for default to result from either of two latent causes:
￿nancial incentives making default the action that maximizes lifetime utility and binding household
liquidity constraints. The likelihood function of our model takes into account the fact that we do not
observe which of the two underlying causes actually triggers default in each particular case. Carefully
distinguishing between these two causes is important, because unlike prime borrowers, subprime mortgage
borrowers tend to have poor credit quality and thus are likely to face liquidity constraints in making
monthly payments. Second, our data set includes recent observations from a nationally representative
sample of subprime mortgages, allowing us to focus on the drivers behind the recent wave of mortgage
defaults. In contrast, a closely related paper by Deng, Quigley, and van Order (2000) examines prime
mortgage borrowers, for whom default is much less common. Third, the level of detail in our data allows
us to control for loan terms and borrower risk factors that some previous work could not adequately take
into account. Moreover, our paper systematically examines the e⁄ects of several variables that economic
theory suggests ought to a⁄ect the decision to default, including expectations about home prices, the
volatility of home prices, the amount of time remaining until the next rate reset for ARMs, and the
ratio of monthly mortgage payments to monthly income. By controlling for a more comprehensive list
of potential drivers of default, we are better able to assess the relative importance of various factors, as
compared to the existing literature. Finally, in contrast to more descriptive work such as Demyanyk and
van Hemert (2008), we estimate structural equations derived from a model of default in which borrowers
maximize their utility and face liquidity constraints.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a model of borrower default
on mortgage loans. In Section 3, we describe the data. Section 4 presents model estimates and other
empirical ￿ndings. In Section 5, we discuss policy implications of our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Our model of housing default builds on the empirical frameworks proposed by Deng, Quigley, and van
Order (2000), Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995), and Archer, Ling, and McGill (1996). The empirical
literature has traditionally modeled mortgage default using option pricing theory, where the decision
6to default is treated as a put option. In this framework, it is optimal for a homeowner to default if
and only if doing so increases her wealth. Following this earlier literature, we begin by considering the
case of a frictionless environment without transaction costs or credit constraints. We next incorporate
expectations about home prices, interest rates, and credit constraints into our model. We demonstrate
that a household￿ s optimal decision rule takes the form of a system of two inequalities and can be
represented as a bivariate probit with partial observability, a type of model ￿rst studied by Poirier
(1980).
A natural alternative to our framework would be to estimate a completely speci￿ed, structural dynamic
model of the decision to default in the spirit of Rust (1987). We do not follow this approach in our paper
for three reasons. First, our data set contains 2.6 million observations of default decisions made by 135,000
borrowers over multiple months. The approach of Rust (1987) is computationally intensive and would
require computing the optimal default decision for each of these borrowers. This is not computationally
feasible without the use of multiple processors and supercomputing. Second, this approach requires us
to fully specify the model. In particular, we would need to estimate an auxiliary time series model of
home price dynamics in order to specify an agent￿ s beliefs about the future evolution of home prices.
This is di¢ cult in our application because home price dynamics in the last decade were atypical. Such
large, nationwide increases and then decreases in home prices have not been observed in the post-war
period. Misspecifying beliefs about home prices could lead to large biases in our parameter estimates
and potentially lead us to misinterpret the causes of the current default wave. Finally, our data set
has a large number of covariates, which capture heterogeneity in borrowers￿ability and willingness to
continue paying their mortgages. Because of its computational complexity, the approach of Rust (1987)
typically requires the researcher to limit attention to just a few state variables. We believe that this is
not appropriate for a ￿rst set of estimates, since it would limit our ability to learn about the in￿ uence of
this rich set of covariates on default decisions.
Our approach instead is to build on the papers listed above. Our model of optimal default decisions
is rigorously derived from economic theory. However, we rely on more parsimoniously speci￿ed models
which have been widely used in the empirical literature. As a result, we can estimate our model using
standard techniques from the discrete choice literature. This more parsimonious speci￿cation has two
advantages. First, we can consider multiple causes for the current default wave. Second, we can include
a large number of variables in our model to control for borrowers￿ability and willingness to pay. A fully
speci￿ed structural model would not have this ￿ exibility because of computational costs.
7In future work, we plan on extending our results by estimating a fully speci￿ed structural model as
in Rust (1987). This will allow us to study counterfactuals, such as how borrowers would alter default
decisions in response to di⁄erent mortgage contracts. We believe that the framework in this paper
will help us to justify the modeling restrictions that are required to estimate a more complicated, fully
structural model.
2.1 Optimal Default without Liquidity Constraints
Let i index borrowers and t index time periods. Let Vit and Lit refer to the value of borrower i￿ s home
and the outstanding principal on i￿ s mortgage at time t, respectively. We can normalize the time period
in which i purchases her home to t = 0. Let git denote the nominal rate of increase in home prices




(1 + git0) (1)
That is, the current home value is the initial home value times the rate of increase in home prices
between time periods 0 and t. In our empirical analysis, we de￿ne git using the Case-Shiller price
index corresponding to the location (MSA) and tercile of the appraised value of i￿ s house at the date of
origination. Empirically, there has been considerable time-series variation in Vit. In general, Vit > Vi0
for buyers who have held their homes for many years. However, for more recent buyers it may be the
case that Vit < Vi0 because of a nationwide decline in home prices starting in mid-2006. There has been
considerable cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of home price declines as well. San Francisco
and Las Vegas have experienced 33% and 37% declines from their peaks respectively, while Dallas and
Charlotte have witnessed ￿ at home prices. Moreover, the magnitude of price declines varied substantially
across houses in di⁄erent price tiers. From April 2006 to April 2008, the Case-Shiller index averaged
across cities declined by 21.3% at the bottom tercile, by 18.6% at the middle tercile, and by 14.3% at the
top tercile.
The evolution of the outstanding principal, Lit, is more complicated. Lit depends on the original
loan amount, loan term, contract interest rate, rules for interest rate resets, and the history of mortgage
payments. In order to economize on notation, we shall not write down an explicit formula for Lit.
However, the empirical analysis makes use of the fact that we observe in the data the outstanding
principal as well as a complete speci￿cation of the contract terms that determine how Lit evolves.
82.1.1 Frictionless Environment
First consider optimal default in a ￿frictionless￿environment in which there are no penalties from default
(either explicit or in terms of damaged credit), no transaction costs (including search costs of ￿nding a
new house), and no credit constraints. By assumption, a borrower who defaults is able to immediately
repurchase another house. In this extremely stylized model, i will choose to default if and only if
Vit ￿ Lit < 0 (2)
If Vit ￿ Lit > 0, then default would be suboptimal, because the borrower￿ s overall wealth would decline
by the amount of her net equity, Vit￿Lit. If Vit￿Lit < 0, the borrower could default, thereby increasing
her wealth by Lit ￿ Vit, and then repurchase an identical house.2
Even this highly stylized model has testable predictions for cross-sectional and time-series variation
in default behavior. First, the model predicts that ceteris paribus, default is more likely for homeowners
in markets such as San Francisco and Las Vegas than in markets like Dallas and Charlotte, because
homeowners in the former cities have experienced larger drops in Vit. If the decline is su¢ ciently large,
inequality (2) will hold, triggering default. Similarly, due to recent price drops, default should be more
likely for recent home buyers, whose homes are more likely to be worth less currently than at the time
of purchase. Third, our model predicts that borrowers who have made only small downpayments (and
therefore have higher Lit) are more likely to default.
2.1.2 Expectations about Home Prices
Next, we generalize our model to include expectations about future home prices. The relevant home price
as far as optimal default is concerned is the market value at the time of sale. In typical housing markets,
there is at least a three-to-six month lag between when a home is listed and when the home is sold. As
a result, current default will depend on the household￿ s expectations. Let Egit represent borrower i￿ s
expectation in period t, given her current information, about the future growth rate in home prices. The
2This argument holds even for exotic loans such as interest-only loans. One might think that since borrowers do not
make any principal payments for some months under interest-only loans, the borrowers would not have an incentive to
default on their mortgages even if Vit ￿Lit < 0. However, if the borrowers default on their current mortgage and obtain a
new, identical interest-only mortgage for a home worth Lit, they can enjoy a greater ￿ow of housing services from a more
valuable asset while still not making any principal payments.
9borrower will be able to sell the home in the next period for an expected value of Vit(1 + Egit). If she
is risk-neutral and there is no discounting, it is optimal for her to default if and only if
Vit(1 + Egit) ￿ Lit < 0 (3)
Our model predicts that default will be more likely in cities where homeowners forecast steep price
declines than in cities where borrowers expect prices to remain ￿ at. We shall describe our approach to
measuring Egit in the next subsection.
A richer model might also allow the default decision to depend on higher-order moments of future
home prices. For example, the higher the variance in home prices over time, the greater the potential
gains in housing wealth if prices go up, while the potential downside is limited by the option to default.
The added option value generated by higher price volatility decreases the incentive to default even if
inequality (3) holds, to a degree depending on the borrower￿ s level of risk aversion. Modeling the impact
of variance on consumer utility in a completely structural manner is beyond the scope of this paper. As
a compromise, we modify (3) to also control for the reduced-form e⁄ect of the variance of git:
Vit(￿1 + ￿2Egit + ￿3V git) ￿ Lit < 0 (4)
The terms ￿1, ￿2, and ￿3￿ to be estimated in our empirical application￿ are free parameters that allow
the default decision to depend ￿ exibly on Vit, Egit, and V git. We include the parameter ￿1 because the
presence of transaction costs￿ for instance, the typical 6% commissions paid to real estate agents￿ causes
the actual value of the home to the borrower to potentially deviate from Vit.
Economic theory suggests additional reasons why expectations should enter into the default decision.
First, there are costs to defaulting, including the transaction costs associated with ￿nding a new house
to rent or buy and the cost of having a damaged credit history. The addition of these costs makes the
default decision a dynamic optimization problem whose solution depends on expectations about future
states of the world, including the evolution of housing prices. Second, option pricing theory suggests that
if agents are not risk-neutral, the appropriate pricing kernel depends on higher moments of the process
by which home prices evolve over time. Fully modeling these complications is beyond the scope of this
paper. Our approach instead is to capture the ￿rst order e⁄ects of expectations by including the ￿rst
two moments as in (4).
An important empirical problem is that it is not clear how to derive expectations of home prices
10from the data. The home prices in our sample were atypical, with large nationwide increases and then
decreases that have not been observed before in the post-war period. Our parsimonious approach allows
us to focus on the problem of alternative strategies for recovering expectations from the data, which we
describe below. In future work, having determined the correct empirical model for beliefs about home
price dynamics, we will estimate a fully speci￿ed structural model in the spirit of Rust (1987). This will
allow us to endogenize the impact of price expectations on default more completely.
Measuring Expectations about Home Prices We construct three measures of Egit: a measure
based on the user cost of housing, another that uses recent price trends (constructed from realizations
of housing prices prior to t) as a proxy for expectations, and a third measure based on future price
trends (constructed from ex post realizations of housing prices, in periods after t). We derive the ￿rst
measure using the standard formula for the user cost of housing, which is based on the observation that
in a housing market in which people can either rent or buy their homes, the marginal buyer must be
indi⁄erent between buying and renting. This implies that the user cost of homeownership must equal
the annual rent:
Cost of ownership at time t =
Vitr
rf
t + Vit!it ￿ Vit￿it(rc
it + !it) + Vit￿it ￿ VitEgit + Vit￿it = Rit
(5)
In this equation, Vit is the house price and Rit the annual rent. The term r
rf
t is the risk-free rate of
return at time t, and therefore Vitr
rf
t is the forgone interest from owning a home. !it is the property tax
rate, ￿it is the e⁄ective tax rate on income, and rc
it is the contract interest rate. The term Vit￿it(rc
it+!it)
represents savings to the homeowner due to the tax-deductibility of mortgage payments and property
taxes. The term ￿it represents the depreciation rate of the house, Egit the expected capital gain, and
￿it the risk premium. Using observed values of Vit, Rit, r
rf
t , !it, ￿it, rc
it, ￿it, and ￿it, we can impute
expected housing price appreciation by solving for Egit:
Egit = r
rf
t + !it ￿ ￿it(rc




Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) impute Egit using equation (6) and decompose it into two
components. The ￿rst component, Eg
f
i , is the expected growth due to ￿fundamentals,￿ which they
proxy using the average annual home price growth rate between 1950 and 2000. We can think of this
as the long-run price trend in each market. Note that this term is ￿xed within an MSA and therefore is
captured by the MSA ￿xed e⁄ects in our empirical speci￿cation. The remainder, Egb
it, captures expected
11growth that is unexplained by fundamental factors, and re￿ ects short-run deviations due to speculative
bubbles. Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) report a variant of Egb
it in their paper, which we use in
our empirical model. See Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) for more details.
For our second measure of expected house price appreciation, we assume that Egit = gi;t￿1. That is,
expectations about home prices are adaptive and equal to the previous period￿ s home price appreciation.
In principle, we could use a more elaborate time series model to construct a backward-looking measure
of Egit. However, the price trend during the last part of our sample was atypical because of the
nationwide home price declines. Therefore, we prefer a simpler speci￿cation that does not place weight
on observations from the distant past in forming price forecasts.
For the third measure, we assume that Egit = gi;t+1. That is, households have perfect foresight about
home price movements￿ an extreme form of rational expectations￿ and have expectations equal to the
ex post realized home price appreciation in the next period.
2.1.3 Interest Rates
Finally, we allow the optimal default decision to depend on interest rates. Theory predicts that when
market interest rates are high relative to the contract rate, the incentive to default is lower. If the contract
rate is less than the current market rate available to the borrower, default implies losing the future value
of the discount. Following Deng, Quigley, and van Order (2000), we compute the normalized di⁄erence
between the present value of the payment stream discounted at the contract rate and the present value


































In (7), the term Pit is the monthly payment for the mortgage, TMit is the number of remaining months
until maturity, rm
it is the market rate for i at time t, and rc
it is the contract rate.3 Note that IRit is an
increasing function of rc
it, a decreasing function of rm
it , and an increasing function of TMit if rc
it > rm
it . A
higher value of IRit implies a stronger incentive to default. For example, households locked into a lower
3For adjustable-rate mortgages, Pit and rc
it may vary over the course of the loan, but for simplicity, we assume that Pit
and rc
it remain constant at the levels of the current month t. We also assume that rm
it remains constant at the level of the
current month t.
12rate are less likely to default. Accounting for IRit yields the optimal default rule
Vit(￿1 + ￿2Egit + ￿3V git) ￿ Lit(1 + ￿4IRit) < 0 (8)
The market interest rate rm
it should vary across households because of di⁄erences in credit histories and
other risk factors, but is not directly observed in our data. Fortunately, the LoanPerformance data cover
a large majority of all subprime mortgage originations and detailed borrower characteristics. We can
therefore form a very precise estimate of rm
it that controls for both observed and unobserved household-
level heterogeneity. Details behind our procedure for estimating rm
it are described in Appendix A.
We would ideally also like to control for expectations about interest rates, just as we control for
house price expectations. Doing so in a fully structural way is di¢ cult, particularly because mortgage
rates changed in an atypical manner during our sample period, and is beyond the scope of our research.
However, we do incorporate one prominent source of interest rate changes: rate resets for adjustable-rate
mortgages. If a borrower expects that her contract interest rate will reset to a higher level in the near
future, ceteris paribus, she will have a stronger incentive to default. Let MRit denote the number of
months before the next rate reset for borrower i in period t.4 We can then write our default decision as
Vit(￿1 + ￿2Egit + ￿3V git) ￿ Lit(1 + ￿4IRit + ￿5MRit) < 0 (9)
Dividing both sides of the equation by Lit yields
Vit
Lit
(￿1 + ￿2Egit + ￿3V git) ￿ (1 + ￿4IRit + ￿5MRit) < 0 (10)
2.2 Liquidity Constraints
In the previous section, we considered a model in which borrowers default whenever doing so increases
wealth. This type of model is referred to as ￿ruthless￿default in the mortgage literature (Vandell, 1995).
The earlier literature has found that the ruthless default model provides an incomplete explanation of
borrower behavior. Researchers have argued that liquidity constraints and access to credit are impor-
tant explanatory variables in modeling default behavior in mortgage and credit markets more generally
(Adams, Einav, and Levin, 2008; Deng, Quigley, and van Order, 2000; Kau, Keenan, and Kim, 1993).
In this section, we consider two explanations of how credit constraints may trigger default. The ￿rst is
that default is triggered by interest rate resets. The second explanation comes from theoretical models
of credit constraints.
4For ￿xed-rate mortgages, we set MRit=0 and then include a separate dummy for ￿xed-rate mortgages.
13With regard to the former, an often-cited reason in the popular media for the increase in borrower
default rates is that homeowners lack adequate income to make mortgage payments after interest rate
resets. For example, on a $300,000 ARM with a 30-year term, an increase in the interest rate from 9%
to 11% generates an increase of over $400, or a 15% increase, in monthly payments. This sharp increase
in mortgage payments makes it di¢ cult for the household to service its debt in addition to paying for
other expenses such as food, gasoline, and clothing.
Let Pit denote i￿ s mortgage payment, Cit the consumption of a composite commodity, and Yit income.
Household i￿ s budget constraint at time t can then be expressed as
Pit + Cit ￿ Yit (11)
Suppose that consumption Cit is ￿xed in each time period and does not adjust in response to changes
in scheduled mortgage payments Pit. A household would then be forced to default if it is unable to








This motive for default is not rigorously grounded in economic theory since it assumes that consumption
of the composite commodity is ￿xed. However, if we are willing to abstract from substitution between
consumption of housing and other goods, (12) captures the popular explanation described above.
The budget constraint (12) assumes that household i is in a state of autarky, without any savings or
access to credit outside of the mortgage market. We can relax this assumption by allowing households to
have access to other forms of credit as well as to tap into savings. Theoretical models of credit constraints
suggest that creditworthiness and future income determine the amount i can borrow (see Aiyagari, 1994;
Deaton, 1991; Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R￿os-Rull, 2007; Chatterjee, Corbae, and R￿os-Rull,
2008). Thus, let Zit be a vector of covariates that serve as predictors of creditworthiness and future
income, including credit score or employment status. Zit also proxies for household i￿ s savings in assets
other than its house. Incorporating Zit into the budget constraint (12), we assume i defaults if






) < 0 (13)
The budget constraint (13) nests various liquidity-related triggers of default. The parameters ￿1, ￿2,
and ￿3 allow us to ￿ exibly model i￿ s budget constraint as a function of the payment-to-income ratio Pit
Yit
and covariates Zit. The e⁄ect of interest rate resets enters through Pit
Yit,and the interaction term Zit(Pit
Yit)
allows for the possibility that an increase in the payment-to-income ratio has a bigger impact on borrowers
14with low credit quality. Note that we do not explicitly include Cit
Yit in equation (13). In our empirical
application, we assume that the ratio of consumption to income is constant over time and can therefore
be captured by allowing for household-level heterogeneity, re￿ ected in the random coe¢ cient ￿0i.
2.3 Empirical Framework
Equations (10) and (13) represent two drivers of default: borrowers default either because doing so
increases their wealth or because credit constraints bind. As econometricians, we only observe whether
a given household defaults in each period t. When we observe default, we do not know whether it is due
to (10), (13), or both (10) and (13).
We formulate our econometric model by de￿ning two latent utilities, U1;it and U2;it, constructed from
the left-hand sides of expressions (10) and (13) with the addition of stochastic errors "1;it and "2;it. For
household i at time t:
U1;it = ￿0i + Vit
Lit(￿1 + ￿2Egit + ￿3V git) ￿ (￿4IRit + ￿5MRit) + "1;it





U1;it represents the latent utility associated with not defaulting. The term "1;it is an iid shock
and represents idiosyncratic di⁄erences across borrowers and time in their utility from not defaulting.
U2;it represents the budget constraint of household i at time t, and "2;it is an idiosyncratic shock to the
tightness of the household budget constraint. The terms U1;it and U2;it are correlated with each other
through the observable covariates Vit, Lit, Egit, V git, IRit, MRit, Pit
Yit, and Zit, as well as through the
distribution of the unobservables "1;it and "2;it. We assume "1;it and "2;it are jointly normal with a
variance of 1 and a covariance of ￿. The terms ￿0i and ￿0i capture time-invariant, unobserved borrower
heterogeneity in U1;it and U2;it. For instance, if borrowers di⁄er in their degree of emotional attachment
to their homes, they will exhibit di⁄erent default behavior even if they face the same ￿nancial incentive
to default, and the di⁄erence is captured by ￿0i. On the other hand, if borrowers di⁄er in their access to
informal sources of credit (such as other family members), such a di⁄erence is captured by ￿0i. ￿0i and
￿0i are identi￿ed by within-borrower variation in the observable predictors of default, and accounting for
the unobserved heterogeneity is important for robustness. In principle, we could estimate ￿0i and ￿0i
as ￿xed e⁄ects. However, we treat them as random e⁄ects, because the large size of our sample makes
it computationally costly to estimate ￿xed e⁄ects.
15We de￿ne the outcome as the random variable NDit, which equals 1 if household i does NOT default
in period t and as 0 otherwise. The condition for default is as follows:
NDit = I(U1;it ￿ 0) ￿ I(U2;it ￿ 0) = 0; ) Default , fU1;it < 0 or U2;it < 0g (15)
where I(￿) is an indicator function and the outside options for both U1;it and U2;it are normalized to
zero. From the data, we observe the value of NDit. However, when default occurs (NDit = 0) we do
not observe whether it is because U1;it < 0, because U2;it < 0, or both.
The data-generating process for the observed outcome corresponds to a bivariate probit model with
partial observability. By modeling default as the outcome of a two-equation model, our approach
contrasts with the existing literature, in which researchers have typically included in a single equation
both the determinants of ￿nancial incentives and measures of liquidity (Archer, Ling, and McGill, 1996;
Demyanyk and van Hemert, 2008). A single-equation model is misspeci￿ed because it fails to account
for the fact that the ￿nancial incentives are relevant for default decisions only if the liquidity constraint
does not bind, and vice versa.
Among the covariates Zit entering the liquidity equation, we include measures of creditworthiness,
such as the FICO score,5 whether the borrower has other mortgage loans on the property, and the monthly
unemployment rate at the county level. We also include observable loan characteristics that proxy for
credit quality, such as the level of documentation for the loan application and the loan-to-value ratio at
origination. Borrowers with low documentation on income or wealth are more likely to have low credit
and have liquidity problems. Loans with higher loan-to-value ratios at origination are more likely to
attract illiquid borrowers, many of whom would have been unable to obtain mortgages under tighter
terms.
In principle we could specify the borrower￿ s decision as a choice among three options by distinguishing
between prepayment and regular continuation of scheduled payments. In the above baseline speci￿cation,
the choice of no default includes both prepayment as well as the decision to make only scheduled payments.
Therefore, if certain factors in￿ uence both default probability and prepayment probability, they are
re￿ ected in our coe¢ cient estimates, which essentially capture only the ￿net￿e⁄ect. To check whether our
key ￿ndings are sensitive to this modeling choice, we estimate an alternative model in which prepayment
5An important feature of the data is that the FICO score is the score in the household￿ s loan application, and does not
re￿ect any credit risk generated by the loan itself. We can think of the FICO score as the household￿ s creditworthiness
just before it took out the mortgage.
16and default are dependent competing hazards. As a separate exercise, we also estimate the baseline
model after dropping all loans ending in prepayment.
3 Data
Our estimation uses data from LoanPerformance on subprime and Alt-A mortgages that were originated
between 2000 and 2007 and securitized in the private-label market. The LoanPerformance data set
covers more than 85% of all securitized subprime and Alt-A mortgages. According to the Mortgage
Market Statistical Annual, 55%-75% of all subprime mortgages were securitized in the early- to mid-
2000s. Because sample selection is based on securitization, our sample may di⁄er from the subprime
mortgage market as a whole.
For each loan, we observe the loan terms and borrower characteristics reported at the time of origi-
nation, including the identity of the originator and servicer, the type of mortgage (￿xed rate, adjustable
rate, etc.), the frequency of rate resets (in the case of ARMs), the initial contract interest rate, the level
of documentation (full, low, or nonexistent6), the appraisal value of the property, the loan-to-value ratio,
whether the loan is a ￿rst-lien loan, the existence of prepayment penalties, the location of the property
(by zip code), the borrower￿ s FICO score,7 and the borrower￿ s debt-to-income ratio. We exclude from
our sample exotic mortgage types such as interest-only or balloon loans, and focus on standard ￿xed-rate
and adjustable-rate mortgages. We further restrict our sample to ￿rst-lien mortgages. See Table 1 for
variable de￿nitions.
The data also track each loan over the course of its life, reporting the outstanding balance, delinquency
status, current interest rate, and scheduled payment in each month. We de￿ne default as occurring if
either the property forecloses or becomes real-estate owned (REO). Default is a terminal event, so if a
loan defaults in month t, the loan is no longer in the sample starting from month t + 1. One important
time-varying variable that enters into the liquidity equation (13) is the payment-to-income ratio, Pit
Yit.
6Full documentation indicates that the borrower￿ s income and assets have been veri￿ed. Low documentation refers
to loans for which some information about only assets has been veri￿ed. No documentation indicates there has been no
veri￿cation of information about either income or assets.
7According to Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2007), FICO scores represent the credit quality of a potential borrower
based on the probability that the borrower will experience a negative credit event (default, delinquency, etc.) in the next
two years. FICO scores fall between 300 and 850, with higher scores indicating a lower probability of a negative event.
17While we do not observe income at the household level in each month, we can impute household income
at the time of origination based on the reported front-end debt-to-income ratio.8 The front-end debt-
to-income ratio is available only for a very small fraction (3.5%) of all loans, signi￿cantly reducing our
sample. To see if our results are sensitive to this sample restriction, we also construct an alternative
imputation of household income based on the back-end debt-to-income ratio,9 which is available for 63%
of all loans and therefore permits a much more representative estimation sample to be used. However,
our estimation results are similar across the two speci￿cations, so throughout this paper we focus on
results based on the subsample for which income can be constructed from the front-end ratio. For more
detailed discussions of the LoanPerformance data, see Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006),
Demyanyk and van Hemert (2007), and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2007).
Because the LoanPerformance data do not report borrowers￿demographic characteristics, we match
the loan-level data to 2000-Census data on demographic characteristics at the zip-code level (per-capita
income, average household size and education, median age of householder, racial composition, etc.).
In addition, we utilize monthly unemployment rates reported at the county level by the Bureau of
Labor and Statistics (BLS). These variables proxy for individual-level demographics and employment
status. Because our proxies are not measured at the level of households, the resulting measurement error
implies that we will not be able to consistently estimate the e⁄ect of individual-level demographics and
employment status on mortgage default. However, since we expect the proxies to be correlated￿ and
in many cases strongly correlated￿ with the correct measures, including these variables will still provide
evidence about the impact of demographics and employment status on mortgage default.
To track movements in home prices, we use housing price indices at the MSA level from Case-Shiller,
which covers 20 major MSAs.10 The HPI for each MSA is normalized to 100 for January 2000. The
home price indices are reported at a monthly frequency, and are determined using the transaction prices
8Speci￿cally, we assume that household income stays constant over time, and approximate it by the scheduled monthly
payment divided by the front-end debt-to-income ratio, both reported as of the time of origination. The front-end ratio
measures housing-related principal and interest payments, taxes, and insurance as a percentage of monthly income.
9The back-end debt-to-income ratio measures all monthly debt obligations, including mortgage payments, car loans,
student loans, and minimum monthly payments on any credit card debt, as a percentage of monthly income. Because we
do not have any information on the amount of other loans that each borrower has, the income imputation based on the
back-end debt-to-income ratio is noisier than the imputation based on the front-end debt-to-income ratio.
10Cities covered by Case-Shiller are Atlanta, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Las Vegas,
Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Tampa, and Washington
D.C.
18of the properties that undergo repeat sales at di⁄erent points in time in a given geographic area. Since
the index is designed to measure price changes for homes whose quality remains unchanged over time,
homes are assigned di⁄erent weights depending on the length of time between the two transactions, along
with other rules of thumb indicating the likelihood that the home has undergone major renovations.11
In addition, for 17 out of the 20 MSAs covered by Case-Shiller, the HPI is also broken into three price
tiers￿ low, medium, and high￿ depending on the quantile of the ￿rst transaction price of the property
within the distribution of all observed transaction prices occurring during the period of the ￿rst sale.12
We use the tier-speci￿c HPI in constructing Vit, Egit, and V git for the 17 MSAs for which it is available
because doing so helps capture some of the unobserved within-MSA variation in housing price movements.
For the remaining three MSAs, we use the MSA-level HPI.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for key variables. We report separate summary statistics according
to the termination mode￿ prepaid loans, defaulted loans, and loans that are either paid to maturity or
censored by the end of the sample. In the last category, virtually all of the loans are censored, so in the
following discussion, we shall simply refer to the third category as the ￿censored￿observations.
The raw relationships between the termination mode and measures of borrowers￿ability to pay are
generally consistent with our hypotheses. Loans that default tend to be adjustable-rate mortgages, are
associated with higher initial loan-to-value ratios, and tend to be issued to borrowers with lower credit
scores. For instance, ￿xed-rate mortgages comprise 31.5% of all loans, 26.8% among loans that prepay,
and 46.3% among the censored loans, while comprising only 18.4% of loans that default. The average
FICO score in the sample is 623 but the average is much lower conditional on default (584).
Table 2 also summarizes time-varying variables, both as an average over the course of each loan (the
second panel) as well as for the last period in which we observe each loan (the third panel). Relative
to the overall average, borrowers that default tend to have less equity as well as higher payment-to-
income ratios. To be more precise about the magnitudes of these e⁄ects, log(V=L) is on average 0.481
11The index assigns zero weight to houses that have undergone repeat transactions within a span of six months. Lower
weights are also assigned to houses for which the change in transaction price is an outlier within a geographic area. Finally,
houses with a higher initial sales price are assigned a higher weight.
12The three MSAs lacking tier-speci￿c price indices are Charlotte, Dallas, and Detroit. Case-Shiller reports the tier cuto⁄s
(in terms of dollar values) in each MSA for the last month in the series. To back out cuto⁄ values in previous periods,
we assume that at each point in time, the low/medium (medium/high) cuto⁄ grows at a rate equal to the average rate of
growth for the low- and medium-tier (medium- and high-tier) price indices. (CC)
19over the course of each loan and 0.487 in the last observed period. The average is higher conditional
on prepayment (0.524 in the last period) and much lower for loans that default (0.361). The average
monthly payment-to-income ratio is 0.301 over the course of the loan and 0.312 in the ￿nal period. This
ratio tends to be highest among loans that default (0.345 in the ￿nal period), somewhat lower among
loans that prepay (0.320), and lowest among the censored loans (0.281).
Consistent with theory, default tends to occur at points in time when the trend in housing prices is
low, as measured by the change over the previous twelve months. The measure based on user costs tells
largely the same story, although the forward-looking measure does not show the same pattern. Default is
also associated with lower volatility in housing prices, though of course, our measure of volatility (i.e., the
normalized standard deviation of housing prices over the previous twelve months) is highly correlated with
the trend. Furthermore, as we would expect, the data indicate that conditional on default, borrowers
tend to have higher interest rates than the market rate. For loans that end in default, IR has an average
value of 0.048 at the point of default, compared to an overall average of 0.037 for the ￿nal observation
across all loans. Finally, default is more prevalent in areas with lower income and less education.
4 Results
4.1 Bivariate Probit with Partial Observability
We begin by discussing estimates from our baseline model (14), i.e., the bivariate probit with partial
observability. The dependent variable in the baseline model is default or no default in a given month.
We consider a wide range of alternative speci￿cations in order to assess the robustness of the results to
our modeling assumptions. The coe¢ cient estimates and marginal e⁄ects are reported in Tables 3-4.13
Table 3a uses the ￿backward-looking￿measure of home price expectations, Exp_Bwd, based on price
trends in the past. In Table 3b, we instead use either Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai￿ s measure based
on user-costs, Exp_HMS, or the ￿forward-looking￿measure, Exp_Fwd, based on future price trends.
13In Tables 3-4, we express all marginal e⁄ects in terms of the e⁄ect on the probability of ￿no default,￿P(U1 ￿ 0; U2 ￿ 0),
with all independent variables set at their mean values conditional on eventual default. The reason why we evaluate the
marginal e⁄ects at the mean values conditional on eventual default, instead of the more conventional unconditional sample
mean, is because the probability of default in a given period is very low, meaning that we encounter numerical problems
when trying to compute the marginal e⁄ects at the unconditional sample mean.
20In Table 4, we add household-level random e⁄ects to the model. For each particular speci￿cation in
the tables, the column labeled ￿Eqn 1￿includes the covariates and parameter estimates that determine
U1;it in equation (14). The column labeled ￿Eqn 2￿includes the covariates and parameter estimates
that determine U2;it. In Table 5, we display estimates of the change in the probability of default due
to an increase in each independent variable by one standard deviation, divided by the baseline default
probability. The baseline default probability is de￿ned by setting all explanatory variables equal to their
mean values conditional on eventual default.
Table 3a reports the ￿rst set of results, beginning with Speci￿cation 1, a parsimonious model in which
U1;it is only determined by the ratio of the home value to the outstanding loan balance. The discussion
in Section 2.1.1 suggests that the incentives to default decrease as this ratio increases. In our empirical
analysis, we choose to use the natural logarithm of the ratio of the home value to the loan balance
instead of untransformed ratio, because the denominator can be very close to zero for loans that are
nearing maturity. Taking the natural log prevents these observations from having unduly large in￿ uence
on our estimates.
The estimates of Speci￿cation 1 in Table 3a are consistent with the predictions of Section 2.1.1:
borrowers with lower value-to-loan ratio are more likely to default. Our estimates of the marginal
e⁄ects in Speci￿cation 1 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in log(
V
L
) is associated with a
24.22% reduction in the hazard of default in a given month. This suggests that the sharp decline in
home prices played an important role in the recent increase in foreclosures. Consider a hypothetical
household in Phoenix that purchases a home in February 2007 with a 30-year ￿xed-rate mortgage and
no downpayment. The household￿ s log(
V
L
) is then 0 at the time of purchase. Further assume that
the household makes monthly payments such that the outstanding balance on the mortgage in February
2008 is 29
30 of the original loan amount. If there is no change in home price between February 2007
and February 2008, the household￿ s log(
V
L
) in February 2008 would be 0.034. During this time period,
however, home prices in Phoenix fell by 21.7%. If this household￿ s property value experienced the average
home price change in Phoenix, its log(
V
L
) at the end of this time period would be -0.211. Thus, the
decline in home price makes the household 16.9% more likely to default in February 2008 compared to
the hypothetical case of no change in home price. The estimated impact of log(
V
L
) decreases when we
add MSA- and year ￿xed e⁄ects (Speci￿cation 4), since these ￿xed e⁄ects soak up some of the variation
in home price changes. However, we still ￿nd that net equity in the property plays an important role in




21with a 7.55% lower hazard of default even after we control for expectations about home price appreciation
and volatility (Exp_Bwd, V ol) and MSA- and year ￿xed e⁄ects.
As we would expect from our discussion in Section 2.2, an increase in the ratio of monthly mortgage
payments to monthly income predicts an increase in the probability of default. According to Speci￿cation
1, a one-standard-deviation increase in this ratio (0.12) is associated with a 17.15% greater hazard of
default. This suggests that interest rate resets for ARMs contributed to the recent increase in foreclosures
by making it di¢ cult for ARM-holders to meet their increased monthly payments. For Speci￿cations
2￿ 4 of Table 3a, we interact the ratio with the borrower￿ s credit score, and ￿nd that the e⁄ect is stronger
for borrowers with low or medium credit than for those with high credit. This is consistent with the
idea that liquidity constraints are less severe for high-credit households because they have greater access
to the capital market.
In addition, the estimates in Table 3a indicate that the measures of borrower creditworthiness that
a⁄ect households￿access to the capital market are important drivers of default as well. According to
Speci￿cation 1, a low-documentation loan has a 0.3 percentage point higher chance of default in a given
month, or equivalently, a 39.81% increase in the hazard of default. A borrower who has more than
one mortgage on the property is 125.37% more likely to default on her ￿rst-lien loan than an otherwise
identical borrower with only one mortgage. The marginal e⁄ect of a one-standard-deviation increase in
the FICO score￿ about 74 points￿ corresponds to a decrease in default probability of 0.518 percentage
points, or 77.09% of the hazard. Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase in the original loan-to-
value (0.14) is associated with a 21.52% greater hazard, and a one-standard-deviation increase in the
local unemployment rate (1.42%) is associated with a 10.09% greater hazard. The magnitudes of these
estimates do not vary much across Speci￿cations 1-4.
Following the discussions in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, we also include additional determinants of the
￿nancial incentive to default in the equation for U1;it￿ namely, Eg, V g, IR, and MR￿ and report the
estimates in Speci￿cations 2 and 3 of Table 3a. Speci￿cation 4 is the most comprehensive speci￿cation,
with the loan age, local demographics, MSA dummies, servicer dummies, and year ￿xed e⁄ects all included
as regressors. The estimates from Speci￿cations 2￿ 4 indicate that higher house price growth over the
previous twelve months reduces the ￿nancial incentive to default. The estimate from Speci￿cation 4,
for instance, implies that in markets where housing prices have been appreciating at an annual rate 10%
above the sample average, the hazard of default is 4.22% lower than for an otherwise identical borrower
22in an average housing market.
Besides the expected trend, expectations about price volatility also a⁄ect default behavior. When we
include the volatility of housing prices over the previous twelve months among the independent variables,
along with its interaction with log(
V
L
), the uninteracted term has almost no e⁄ect, while the interaction
decreases the propensity to default. Speci￿cally, at the average level of log(
V
L
), an increase of 1.46 (one
standard deviation) in the volatility measure is associated with a 2.77% lower hazard of default, according
to our results in Speci￿cation 4. Therefore, our ￿ndings suggest that volatile home price movements
increase the option value of holding onto the mortgage, and that this e⁄ect is larger for those borrowers
with higher net equity in the property. One conjecture that would imply such a di⁄erential e⁄ect is that
risk aversion declines with wealth. Assuming that households with greater net equity also tend to be
wealthier overall, the option value generated by volatility would thus be greater for households with more
net equity.
The estimates of the e⁄ect of interest rates are weak but consistent with model predictions. We
￿nd that IR (a measure of how ￿overpriced￿ contract interest rates are, relative to the market rate)
has almost no e⁄ect on the probability of default. This is most likely because high contract interest
rates increase both the incentive to prepay and to default, combined with the fact that prepayment is
classi￿ed under the category of no default in our baseline speci￿cations. As expected, borrowers with
ARMs are riskier. The e⁄ect may be due in part to selection (riskier borrowers choosing ARMs). To the
extent that MR, IR, and P
Y do not fully capture causal e⁄ects of rate resets on default, the coe¢ cient
on ARM may also capture some residual causal e⁄ects of rate resets. Conditional on everything else
being equal, ARM borrowers have a 12% higher hazard of default, according to Speci￿cation 4. Among
ARM-holders, default is also more likely when rate resets are imminent: adding an extra eleven months
between the present period and the next reset results in a lowering of the hazard of default by about
1.34% (Speci￿cation 4).
Finally, the parameter estimates for Loan Age and (Loan Age)2 indicate that over the life of a loan,
there is an initial increase in the probability of default, but that after the ￿rst three years, older loans
are much less likely to default conditional on survival. This ￿hump-shaped￿hazard pro￿le is consistent
with the ￿ndings of other researchers (Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen, 2008; von Furstenberg, 1969). Part
of this e⁄ect could be due to unobserved heterogeneity in households￿propensity to default: loans that
survive are, by de￿nition, more likely to be held by borrowers with a lower unobserved propensity to
23default. However, the estimated e⁄ect of loan age does not become weaker after controlling for random
e⁄ects (Table 4), suggesting that the hazard of default for a given individual indeed varies over the life
of the loan even after controlling for equity and interest rates.
One might expect that subprime borrowers who live in the collateral property (￿owner-occupiers￿ )
exhibit di⁄erent default behavior from those who purchase the property solely for investment purposes
(￿investors￿ ). Owner-occupiers may have a stronger sentimental attachment to the property, making
them reluctant to default even when their ￿nancial incentives dictate doing so. In other words, their
valuation of the house could diverge from the market value (V ) in systematic ways. On the other hand,
investors are plausibly less likely to be bound by liquidity constraints because they have better access to
the credit market. Obviously, the distinction between ￿owner-occupiers￿and ￿investors￿is not always
unambiguous, because most buyers consider possible appreciation when they buy a home and also because
they may not truthfully report their expected occupancy status. Despite this measurement issue, we
use information in the LoanPerformance data on the occupancy status of each borrower to see whether
owner-occupiers and investors behave di⁄erently and, if so, how their default decisions are di⁄erentially
a⁄ected by ￿nancial incentives and liquidity constraints. Cowan and Cowan (2004) have previously
found that default is more likely for properties for which the mortgage borrower is not the occupant.
Interestingly, our data indicate the opposite: 8.28% of all loans held by investors end in default while
the corresponding ￿gure is 11.02% for owner-occupiers. This di⁄erence is driven by the fact that in our
sample owner-occupiers have lower net equity (with log(
V
L
) on average at 0.45, versus 0.68 for investors),
higher payment-to-income ratios (with Pit
Yit on average at 0.31 versus 0.23), lower probability of having a
￿xed-rate mortgage (28.69% versus 54.31%), higher probability of having multiple liens on the property
(13.08% versus 5.68%), and lower FICO scores (615 versus 684).
However, when we re-run Speci￿cation 4 separately for owner-occupiers and investors (reported under
Speci￿cations 5 and 6 in Table 3a), the results suggest that the ￿nancial incentives tend to have stronger
marginal e⁄ects on the probability of default for investors than for owner-occupiers. For instance, the
marginal e⁄ect of a one-standard-deviation increase in log(
V
L
) is 2.66 times larger for investors than for
owner-occupiers. On the other hand, there do not seem to be any systematic di⁄erences between owner-
occupiers and investors regarding how liquidity constraints a⁄ect their default decisions. For example, the
original loan-to-value ratio has larger e⁄ects on investors￿default decisions, while the payment-to-income
ratio is more important for the default decision of owner-occupiers.
24As another robustness check, we re-run Speci￿cation 4 for subprime loans only (that is, excluding
Alt-A loans). The results are reported under Speci￿cation 7 in Table 3a. Comparing the results from
Speci￿cation 4 and Speci￿cation 7 reveals that the smaller sample of subprime loans does not exhibit
systematically di⁄erent default behavior from the overall sample, indicating that the decision to pool
subprime and Alt-A loans in our sample does not drive any of the results.
We also perform some additional robustness checks: (a) adding the initial interest rate as a covariate
for the liquidity equation; (b) using ￿time to ￿rst reset￿instead of ￿time to next reset￿for ARMs, since
the ￿rst reset accounts for much of the increase in interest rates due to resets; and (c) adding originator
￿xed e⁄ects.14 Results from all of these alternative speci￿cations (not reported but available upon
request) are very similar to the baseline results.
In Table 3b, we report results from re-running Speci￿cations 3-4 using Exp_HMS and Exp_Fwd
instead of Exp_Bwd. The results suggest that the relationship between default and home price expec-
tations depends on how we measure expectations. In contrast to our earlier ￿nding that higher price
growth in the previous twelve months (Exp_Bwd) reduces the ￿nancial incentive to default, the propen-
sity to default is actually higher in markets where the user-cost approach (Exp_HMS) implies stronger
house price appreciation, unless we control for demographics as well as MSA, year, and originator ￿xed
e⁄ects, in which case the estimated e⁄ect lowers the propensity but is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Similarly, the propensity to default is higher in markets that would experience higher price growth in
the next twelve months (Exp_Fwd).15 It thus appears that borrower behavior is more consistent with
beliefs that are based on extrapolation, but not with beliefs imputed from the price-to-rent ratio or per-
fect foresight. We do not have a clear explanation as to why this is the case, and in our upcoming work
we plan to investigate the degree to which borrowers are forward-looking and how sophisticated or naive
they are about future housing prices. Here we simply note that the price-to-rent ratio may not be a
particularly good measure of buyers￿expectations if purchase and rental prices are related by a more
complicated mechanism than the one proposed by the standard user cost theory (see equation (5)).
Table 4 adds random e⁄ects to the model￿ ￿0i and ￿0i in (14)￿ in order to control for unobserved
borrower heterogeneity. In principle, we can include ￿xed e⁄ects in our model. However, given the
number of observations in our sample, this is computationally too burdensome. The results for the
14We control for the ten largest originators as measured by the number of loans. Collectively, these ten originators
account for 70% of the sample.
15Estimated coe¢ cients for other ￿nancial and credit quality variables are very similar in Tables 3a and 3b.
25random e⁄ects speci￿cation are similar to those reported in Table 3, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
As before, higher net equity, higher expectations about home prices (measured using Exp_Bwd), higher
volatility in home prices, and lower contract rates all lead to a smaller hazard of default. Similarly,
we still ￿nd that variables representing higher credit quality and less severe liquidity constraints predict
a lower probability of default. The scale parameters for the random e⁄ects in U1;it and U2;it are
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, suggesting that there is a substantial degree of unobserved borrower
heterogeneity in￿ uencing the ￿nancial incentives to default and the tightness of budget constraint. We
￿nd it reassuring that all results carry over to the random e⁄ects speci￿cations despite the large degree
of unobserved borrower heterogeneity.
Table 5, which reports estimates of the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in the independent
variables on the probability of default, conveys the relative signi￿cance of each regressor in default
decisions. Alternatively, we could pose a slightly di⁄erent question. We know that 2006 vintage
loans have had much worse performance than 2004 vintage loans. The cumulative empirical probability
of default within the sample period is 6.48% and 10.81% for mortgages originated in 2004 and 2006,
respectively, despite the fact that older loans have had more time over which to default. How much
of this di⁄erence in performance between older and newer loans can be explained by observed changes
across vintages in each regressor? Such a decomposition would provide an additional way to quantify the
relative importance of various factors behind the recent increase in subprime defaults. Table 6 reports
the mean value of each regressor conditional on vintage for 2004 and 2006 (columns 1 and 2) and the
di⁄erence in means (column 3). The product of this di⁄erence with the marginal e⁄ect of each regressor,
as a percentage of the empirical probability of default for 2004 vintage loans (column 4), indicates the
contribution of each regressor to the higher default probability of 2006 vintage loans compared to 2004
vintage loans.16
Table 6 shows that the biggest contributors to the high probability of default among 2006 vintage
loans are declining home prices and deterioration in the credit quality and liquidity conditions of mortgage
borrowers. Declining home equity contributed to a 55.84% higher hazard of default for 2006 vintage loans
compared to the 2004 vintage. A decrease in house price expectation, measured by recent price trends,
made the holders of 2006 vintage loans 39.92% more likely to default than otherwise identical holders of
2004 vintage loans. A decrease in house price volatility, which could largely re￿ ect the slowdown in home
16We use the marginal e⁄ects from Speci￿cation 3 in Table 3a, not Speci￿cation 4. Since our objective is to compare
loans of di⁄erent vintages, it makes more sense to use a speci￿cation that does not include year ￿xed e⁄ects.
26price appreciation, resulted in a 30.26% higher hazard of default for 2006 vintage loans. Lower credit
quality, as measured by FICO scores, is responsible for a 69.57% larger hazard of default among 2006
vintage mortgage holders. Moreover, having multiple liens on the property and high payment-to-income
ratios among low-credit borrowers are also signi￿cant contributors to the high incidence of default among
2006 vintage loans.
4.2 Univariate Probit
In this section, we estimate a univariate probit model as a check for robustness. Similar to the baseline
model, the outcome is default or no default in a given month. Here, however, we assume that both the
￿nancial incentive to default and borrowers￿liquidity constraints enter into a single equation. Table 7
reports the estimates.
Speci￿cation 1 uses only the covariates included in the ￿nancial incentives equation (Eqn. 1) from
Speci￿cation 3 of Table 3a. Similarly, Speci￿cation 2 includes only the covariates related to the liquidity
equation (Eqn. 2) from Speci￿cation 3 of Table 3a, except for loan age. Each of these speci￿cations is
equivalent to the bivariate probit model with the constant term for one of the two equations constrained
to equal in￿nity and the covariance of the errors constrained to equal zero. The model ￿t, as measured by
the loglikelihood or pseudo-R2, is higher for Speci￿cation 2 than for Speci￿cation 1 of Table 7, providing
additional support for the notion that illiquidity is as empirically important a driver behind default as
￿nancial incentives.
From Speci￿cations 3-5 of Table 7, we see that the qualitative results from the univariate probit model
are generally similar to those from the bivariate probit model, with a few notable exceptions. Similar
to before, default is more likely if the borrower has low net equity in the house. However, the e⁄ects
of expectations about home prices are very di⁄erent, with all expectation measures taking on di⁄erent
signs from the bivariate case. Another notable di⁄erence is the impact of home price volatility. The
interaction between volatility and net equity in the univariate probit regression suggests that volatility
decreases the probability of default more strongly for low-net-equity homeowners than for high-net-equity
homeowners. The implications are the same as before for the measures related to interest rates. Default
is less likely when the market interest rate is higher than the contract rate, because default entails losing
access to the discounted rate. Likewise, for ARMs, default is more likely as the next rate reset gets closer
27in time. Parameter estimates for the measures that represent the liquidity constraint and the overall
credit quality of the borrowers con￿rm prior results: a high payment-to-income ratio, low FICO score,
low documentation level, having multiple liens, and high loan-to-value ratio at origination all lead to an
increased probability of default.
To partially address the concern that continued payments and prepayments are rather distinct events,
we re-run Speci￿cation 3 after excluding prepaid cases from the category of no default. The results
are reported under Speci￿cation 6 of Table 7, which shows that most of the coe¢ cients are qualitatively
stable. Finally, we address the potential concern that the outstanding loan amount, L, is endogenous
because of delinquent payments. Loans typically experience several months of delinquency prior to
foreclosure (which is our de￿nition of default). Thus, riskier loans are more likely to be delinquent as
well as to default, thereby generating positive correlation between L and unobserved determinants of the
propensity to default. To address this endogeneity issue, we construct for each loan in each month the
hypothetical balance that would have been realized if the household had made payments according to
schedule and use the hypothetical log(
V
L
) as an instrument for log(
V
L
). The results (not reported) are
essentially unchanged because of near-perfect correlation between log(
V
L
) and the instrument.
Although the overall results are qualitatively similar between the bivariate and univariate probit
models, the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients for most of the variables tend to be larger in the bivariate
probit results than in the univariate probit, and sometimes much larger. The ￿nancial incentives become
directly relevant for default only when the liquidity constraint does not bind, and vice versa. Because
the univariate probit model does not take this dependency into account, the univariate probit model
underestimates the e⁄ect on default of certain key factors. Our bivariate probit model does not su⁄er
from this misspeci￿cation, giving us better parameter estimates.
4.3 Competing Hazards Model
As an alternative to the probit approach, we also estimate a competing hazards model in which a mortgage
can be terminated by either default or prepayment. Compared to the probit models, the hazards approach
has the advantage of treating prepayment and regularly scheduled payment as separate outcomes and
allowing default and prepayment to be correlated due to unobservables. Moreover, the hazards model
correctly accounts for the fact that we essentially observe only one outcome for each loan￿ the point in
28time when the loan defaults (if ever)￿ by treating the time to default (or prepayment) as the dependent
variable. By contrast, the period-by-period probit model treats the status of the loan in each month as
a separate observation, arti￿cially de￿ ating the standard errors.17 On the other hand, relative to the
bivariate probit model, the hazards model has the disadvantage of being potentially misspeci￿ed because
it treats default as being determined by only a single equation that includes both the covariates for the
￿nancial incentive to default and as well as the covariates for household budget constraints.
For household i, denote the time of default as Tdi and time of prepayment as Tpi, where Tdi and Tpi
are discrete random variables (Obviously, at least one of these stopping times must be censored). The
probabilities of survival past some time t in the future are














Suppose the instantaneous hazards of default and prepayment of household i, hdi(t) and hpi(t), follow a
proportional hazards model:
hdi(t) = exp(￿d(t) + ￿0
dXit + ￿di)
hpi(t) = exp(￿p(t) + ￿0
pXit + ￿pi)
(17)
In other words, the hazards depend on time-dependent ￿baselines￿￿d(t) and ￿p(t), common across all
borrowers; on (potentially) time-varying covariates, Xit; and on unobserved, borrower-speci￿c random
e⁄ects ￿di and ￿pi. Changing the observed covariates Xit results in proportional shifts of the hazard
function relative to the baseline hazards, hence the name ￿proportional hazards.￿
As is well known (Lunn and McNeil, 1995), if the unobserved heterogeneity terms ￿di and ￿pi are
independent, the two risks are independent conditional on observables, so separate estimation of the two
hazard functions yields consistent estimates. When estimating the hazard of default, we would simply
treat loans that end in prepayment as censored observations, similar to loans that are censored by the
end of the sample period. Similarly, when estimating the hazard of prepayment, either a default or the
end of the sample period would result in censoring. When ￿di and ￿pi are not independent, estimation
becomes more involved, but we can still estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood, as in Deng,
17The clustered standard errors that we report partially address this problem, but not entirely. To further investigate
how treating each period as a separate observation might a⁄ect our standard errors, we re-run various speci￿cations of the
univariate probit model using data aggregated by quarter, instead of using monthly observations (and still clustering our
standard errors). The results are reported in Table A1. Using quarterly observations increases our standard errors only
very slightly, indicating that clustering largely mitigates the problem of understated standard errors.
29Quigley, and van Order (2000) and McCall (1996). The likelihood function and estimation details for
the dependent competing hazards model are provided in Appendix B.
In Speci￿cation 1 of Table 8, we report the estimation results for a particular case of independent
hazards. Speci￿cally, we assume that the hazards only depend on observables (i.e., ￿di = ￿pi = 0),
while making no parametric assumptions about the underlying baseline hazards, ￿d(t) and ￿p(t). This
speci￿cation is simply the standard Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972; Cox and Oakes, 1984),
and we can estimate the coe¢ cients ￿d and ￿p by minimizing the ￿partial loglikelihood,￿while essentially
netting out the baseline hazards.
We also estimate a speci￿cation that allows for unobserved correlation in the hazards of default and
prepayment, following Deng, Quigley, and van Order (2000). Speci￿cally, we assume that there are two





(￿d1;￿p1) with probability ￿
(￿d2;￿p2) with probability 1 ￿ ￿
(18)
Results for the model with correlated unobserved hazards are reported as Speci￿cations 2-4 in Table 8.
The hazards model estimates generate implications for default behavior that are similar to what we see
in the bivariate and univariate probit models. We ￿nd that higher net equity decreases the probability of
default while increasing the probability of prepayment. A higher home price growth rate in the previous
twelve months decreases the hazard of default while increasing the hazard of prepayment. Speci￿cation
2 indicates that the greater the contract rate is relative to the market interest rate, the more likely the
borrower is to default and prepay. However, as we add more regressors (Speci￿cations 3￿ 4), the impact of
the interest rate option IR on default changes sign. Borrowers are less likely to default or prepay if they
are farther away from the next rate reset for adjustable-rate mortgages. Again not surprisingly, ￿xed-rate
mortgages are less likely to default or prepay than adjustable-rate mortgages. At a given loan age, both
hazards are approximately two and a half times higher for ARMs than for ￿xed-rate mortgages. The
measures of liquidity constraints display similar patterns as before: borrowers with low documentation,
low FICO scores, multiple liens, and high payment-to-income ratios are more likely to default.
Finally, we ￿nd that there is a high degree of unobserved heterogeneity in both default and prepayment
risk, with the unobserved heterogeneity being somewhat greater for default. This result contrasts with
the ￿ndings of Deng, Quigley, and van Order (2000) who ￿nd substantial and statistically signi￿cant
unobserved heterogeneity in the exercise of the prepayment option but not in the exercise of the default
30option. The di⁄erence between their ￿nding and ours may be due to the di⁄erences in the composition
of the borrower pools in our respective data sets: while their sample is con￿ned to prime mortgage
borrowers, who have a low probability of default in any case, we study subprime mortgage borrowers, for
whom the default risk is much higher. Thus, it makes intuitive sense that our sample exhibits a much
greater degree of unobserved heterogeneity in default behavior.
5 Discussion
Here, we summarize the key results and place them in a broader context. To recapitulate our main
￿ndings: First, declining home prices are an important driver of subprime mortgage default. For a
borrower who purchased a home one year earlier with a 30-year ￿xed-rate mortgage and no downpayment,
a 20% decline in home price makes the borrower 15.38% more likely to default than an otherwise identical
borrower whose home price remained stable.18 Second, borrower and loan characteristics a⁄ecting
borrowers￿ability to pay are as empirically important in predicting default as declining house prices, as
evidenced by the magnitudes of the marginal e⁄ects in Tables 5 and 6.19 Our results suggest that the
increase in defaults in recent years is partly linked to changes over time in the composition of mortgage
recipients. Higher numbers of borrowers who have little documentation, low FICO scores, or multiple
liens on the same property contributed to the increase in foreclosures in the subprime mortgage market.
The increasing prevalence of adjustable-rate mortgages also contributed to rising foreclosures, because
the monthly payments for adjustable-rate mortgages come with periodic￿ and sometimes very large￿
adjustments, forcing liquidity-constrained borrowers to default.20
Viewed in the broader economic landscape, our ￿ndings provide the means to quantify the signi￿cance
of housing prices in generating correlated default. The simultaneous decline in home prices nearly
everywhere in the United States caused the degree of correlation across regions to greatly exceed the
18Based on Speci￿cation 1 in Table 3a. If we use the marginal e⁄ects from Speci￿cation 4, a 20% decline in home price
would make the borrower 4.8% more likely to default, which is much smaller than 15.38%, but still economically signi￿cant.
19We will also compare loglikelihoods from two speci￿cations: a univariate probit model with ￿nancial covariates only
and a univariate probit model with measures of credit quality and liquidity constraints only (corresponding to Speci￿cations
1 and 2 of Table 7). The comparison, which we will discuss in the next section, provides additional support for this claim
that liquidity constraints are as important as declining home prices in explaining default.
20This result is not inconsistent with the claim made by Foote et al. (2008b) that rate resets for ARMs are not the main
problem in the subprime market. Our ￿nding suggests that rate resets play a role in default decisions, but that their role
is not as important as falling home prices or low credit quality of subprime borrowers.
31expectations of credit rating agencies and investors. Indeed, there is much evidence that markets
overrewarded geographic diversity in the structuring and pricing of MBS (Nadauld and Sherlund, 2008),
suggesting that rating agencies and investors either underestimated the degree of crossregional correlation
or underestimated the signi￿cance of the housing price channel in driving default. While acknowledging
that housing prices are an equilibrium phenomenon, our analysis points to a key way in which existing
models may have led to mispricing.
As well, worsening ex post loan outcomes in combination with observed deterioration in the composi-
tion of the borrower pool￿ as measured by FICO scores, loan documentation status, LTV at origination,
and other contract terms￿ informally support the notion that lenders loosened their underwriting stan-
dards and lent to a less and less creditworthy pool of borrowers over time. The importance of composi-
tional changes in explaining the observed rise in default suggests the presence of ￿ aws in the securitization
process. One consequence of securitization is that loan originators do not typically hold the securities
backed by the mortgages that they originate. As a result, they do not bear the ex post consequences
of bad mortgages even as they continue to generate income by originating such loans. This agency
problem, coupled with underestimation of default risks by the ￿nancial market, gave primary lenders an
incentive to lower their lending standards in response to the ￿technological shock￿of securitization and
other related ￿nancial innovations. Thus, a key policy implication is that future waves of default can
be averted by measures that reduce originator moral hazard, such as stronger enforcement of lending
standards.
Our results also help us to evaluate the potential e¢ cacy of various remedies under consideration by
policymakers. We ￿nd empirical relevance for both of the key alternative factors that can theoretically
lead to default: in our model, borrowers default if either their net equity falls below a certain threshold
or if they cannot make their monthly payments due to credit constraints. Notably, most of the policy
alternatives that have actually been proposed have been directed primarily toward payment a⁄ordability.
For example, the FDIC proposal aims to reduce mortgage payments to no more than 31 percent of
borrowers￿pretax income, by means of loan modi￿cations that reduce interest rates or extend the lengths
of the loans. Measures taken by the banking industry similarly focus on modifying loan terms to make
payments more a⁄ordable. While these loan modi￿cations would be helpful in stanching default due
to liquidity constraints, they would have little e⁄ect on borrowers￿equity positions. The empirical
importance of both illiquidity and net equity as drivers of default suggests that e⁄ectively mitigating
foreclosures would require some combination of policies targeting each cause or a single instrument that
32targets both. Write-downs on loan principal amounts are an example of a measure that would address
both causes simultaneously, because a reduction in loan size would increase a borrower￿ s net equity as
well as reduce the monthly payments.21
6 Conclusion
We estimate a model of optimal default by subprime mortgage borrowers. Our model nests four possible
explanations for the recent increase in mortgage defaults: falling home prices, lower expectations about
home prices, increases in borrowers￿contract interest rates relative to market rates, and inability to pay
due to a lack of income or access to credit. The ￿rst three factors a⁄ect borrowers￿￿nancial gains from
default, while the last factor represents the possibility that liquidity constraints may force borrowers to
default even when defaulting is against their long-term ￿nancial interests. We account for the fact that
the ￿nancial incentives are relevant to default decisions only if the liquidity constraint does not bind, and
vice versa. The structural equations of this model can be represented as a bivariate probit with partial
observability.
We estimate our model using unique data from LoanPerformance that track each loan over the course
of its life, and ￿nd evidence for each of the hypothesized factors in explaining default by subprime
mortgage borrowers. In particular, our results suggest that borrower and loan characteristics that
a⁄ect borrowers￿ability to pay are as important in predicting default as the fundamental determinants
of whether it makes ￿nancial sense to default. Declining home prices are indeed an important driver
behind the recent surge in defaults, but for the particular segment of homeowners represented in our
data, deterioration in the credit quality of the pool of borrowers is an equally important factor.
Our ￿ndings have broad macroeconomic implications. In particular, the evidence points to ￿ aws in
the securitization process that led to the current economic downturn. The estimated e⁄ect of housing
prices on default behavior implies that default will be highly geographically correlated when home prices
decline nationwide. Failing to take into account the correct magnitude of this source of correlation
would cause existing pricing models to underestimate the degree of nondiversi￿able risk, impairing the
proper functioning of capital markets. Moreover, deterioration in the observed characteristics of the
21In a recent speech the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, also seemed to advocate simultaneously targeting
both drivers of default.
33borrower pool suggests that underwriting standards became looser, perhaps an equilibrium response to
worsening asymmetric information between lenders and securitizers. Finally, our ￿ndings suggest that
for a foreclosure mitigation policy to produce the desired result, it must address both declining home
equity as well as borrowers￿ability to pay in the short run. In this regard, write-downs on loan principal
amounts may be an e⁄ective measure.
The framework of this paper is essentially static: to capture the dynamic nature of borrowers￿default
decisions, we simply account for the reduced-form e⁄ects of various option values associated with holding
a mortgage. In future work, we shall examine how our results change when we explicitly model borrowers￿
default decisions as an optimal stopping problem. The ￿ndings in this paper suggest the importance of
including credit constraints and inform us on how best to model price expectations in the fully dynamic
model.
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37Appendix A
Imputation of counterfactual re￿nancing interest rates for individual households
We assume that in each time period t, household i is able to re￿nance its mortgage at rate rm
it ,
the market rate adjusted by a household-speci￿c risk premium. To impute this hypothetical rate from
the data, we make the following assumptions about the relationship between rm
it and rc
i0, the initial
contract rate owed during the ￿rst month of the household￿ s actual loan. Let ti0 denote the time period
corresponding to the initial month of the actual loan. j = 1;:::;J index covariates, with zij denoting the
observable household and loan characteristics upon which the actual interest rate is determined, and zm
ij
denoting the covariates that determine the re￿nancing rate. Then,
rc
i0 = f(ti0) +
J X
j=1
gj(ti0) ￿ zij + ￿i
rm






The function f(t) captures the time-varying ￿baseline￿ market interest rate, and the functions gj(t)
capture the time-varying risk premia on characteristics j = 1;:::;J. By restricting the error, ￿i, to
be equal across equations, we are assuming that the household￿ s risk premium is constant over time.
Crucially, among the covariates zij we include controls for the type of mortgage (adjustable-rate or ￿xed-
rate) held by household i. We assume that zm
ij = zij for all characteristics j except for dummies related to
the mortgage type: to preserve comparability across households, we assume that all consumers re￿nance
into ￿xed-rate mortgages.
We estimate the ￿rst equation in (19) using actual originations of all subprime mortgages observed in
the data. Since the LoanPerformance data cover a large majority of subprime mortgage originations, we
can get a very precise estimate of f(t) and fgj(t)gJ
j=1. The residuals from this estimation are interpreted
as household-speci￿c risk premium, ￿i, unexplained by observable characteristics. We then predict the
re￿nancing rate rm
it using the estimated f(t) and g(t) functions, the observable household characteristics,
and the risk premium ￿i recovered from the ￿rst estimation.
We choose to approximate f(t) and g(t) by natural cubic spline functions. A natural cubic spline
function f(t) consists of piecewise cubic polynomials fn(t);n = 0;:::;N ￿ 1 passing through nodes at
t0;t1;:::;tN, with the restriction that f(t) be twice-continuously di⁄erentiable at each node and with
the boundary conditions f00(t0) = f00(tN) = 0. The boundary conditions, which impose local linearity at
38the furthest endpoints, mitigate the tendency for cubic polynomials to take on extreme values near the
endpoints.
We include the following variables among the covariates zij:
￿ FICO score
￿ ￿Low documentation￿and ￿No documentation￿dummies
￿ Dummies for mortgage type. We categorize mortgages as ￿xed-rate mortgages, ARMs that have a
￿rst reset less than a year after origination (which tend to have much lower initial contract rates),
and other types of ARMs.
￿ The loan-to-value ratio at origination
￿ The front-end debt-to-income ratio: the ratio of monthly housing-related principal and interest
payments, taxes, and insurance to monthly income
￿ The back-end debt-to-income ratio: similar to the front-end ratio, but including in the numerator all
payments for non￿ housing-related debts (e.g., car loans, credit card debt) in addition to mortgage
payments
Note that by setting zm
ij = zij for all characteristics j other than the mortgage type, we abstract
from the fact that re￿nancing generally alters the debt-to-income ratio. Moreover, the debt-to-income
and loan-to-value ratios are endogenous, because the amount of debt borrowers are willing to take on
is presumably correlated with the interest rates they are able to obtain. We ignore these issues since
adequately addressing them is beyond the scope of this paper.
Appendix B
Estimation details for dependent competing hazards model
As a robustness check, we estimate a model of dependent competing hazards. We assume that at
time t, borrower i is described by (potentially) time-dependent observable characteristics Xit as well as
a pair of unobservable characteristics (￿di;￿pi), which shift the hazards of default and prepayment. We
39follow Han and Hausman (1990), Deng, Quigley, and van Order (2000), and McCall (1996) in writing the
likelihood function of this model.
Denote the time to default as Td and time to prepayment as Tp, both being discrete random variables.
For economy of notation, we omit the subscript for individual i. The joint survival function, conditional
on observable characteristics X and unobservable type, is then as follows:











We approximate the baseline hazards ￿d(t) and ￿p(t) using a third-order polynomial function of time t.
￿d(t) = ￿0d + ￿1dt + ￿2dt2 + ￿3dt3
￿p(t) = ￿0p + ￿1pt + ￿2pt2 + ￿3pt3
(21)
For the system to be identi￿ed, we normalize ￿0d and ￿0p to zero because these parameters are not
separately identi￿ed from the population means of ￿d and ￿p. Re-estimating Speci￿cation 1 of Table 8
using nonparametric baseline hazard functions instead of the third-order polynomials yields essentially
the same estimates, suggesting that the polynomials give us a good approximation.
Default and prepayment are competing risks, so we only observe the duration associated with the
￿rst terminating event. De￿ne Fd(k j X;￿d;￿p) as the probability that the mortgage is terminated by
default in period k, Fp(k j X;￿d;￿p) as the probability of termination by prepayment in period k, and
Fc(k j X;￿d;￿p) as the probability of censoring in period k by the end of the sample. Following Deng,
Quigley, and van Order (2000), and McCall (1996), we can write the probabilities as follows:
Fd(k j X;￿d;￿p) = S(k;k j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k + 1;k j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ 0:5(S(k;k j X;￿d;￿p)
+S(k + 1;k + 1 j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k + 1;k j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k;k + 1 j X;￿d;￿p))
Fp(k j X;￿d;￿p) = S(k;k j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k;k + 1 j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ 0:5(S(k;k j X;￿d;￿p)
+S(k + 1;k + 1 j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k + 1;k j X;￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k;k + 1 j X;￿d;￿p))
Fc(k j X;￿d;￿p) = S(k;k j X;￿d;￿p)
(22)
The term 0:5(S(k;k j ￿d;￿p) + S(k + 1;k + 1 j ￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k + 1;k j ￿d;￿p) ￿ S(k;k + 1 j ￿d;￿p)) is
an adjustment that is necessary because the durations are discrete random variables. Because we do
not observe ￿d or ￿p in the data, we must form the likelihood function using unconditional probabilities,
40obtained by mixing over the type distribution:
Fd(k j X) = ￿Fd(k j X;￿d1;￿p1) + (1 ￿ ￿)Fd(k j X;￿d2;￿p2)
Fp(k j X) = ￿Fp(k j X;￿d1;￿p1) + (1 ￿ ￿)Fp(k j X;￿d2;￿p2)
Fc(k j X) = ￿Fc(k j X;￿d1;￿p1) + (1 ￿ ￿)Fc(k j X;￿d2;￿p2)
(23)




[I(yi = d)log(Fd(Ki)) + I(yi = p)log(Fp(Ki)) + I(yi = c)log(Fc(Ki))] (24)
where I(yi = j) is equal to one if borrower i￿ s mortgage ends by termination mode j, and equals zero
otherwise.
41Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
NDit
= 1 if loan i does not default in periodt, = 0 if defaults (in foreclosure or Real
Estate Owned)
V/L Market value of the property / Outstanding principal balance
Exp_Bwd Home price growth rate over the previous twelve months
Exp_HMS
Expected  home  price  appreciation based  on  user  costs . T h i s  i s  e q u a l  t o
“ Imputed Rent / Actual Rent”  reported in Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005).
T h i s  m e a s u r e  i s  n o r m a l i z e d  t o  a n  M S A -specific  24 -yr  average.  See
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) for a detailed description.
Exp_Fwd Realized home price growth rate over the next twelve months
Vol Standard deviation of home prices for the past twelve months, divided by 10
IR Difference in the present values of the payment stream at the mortgage note rate
and the current interest rate. Described in the text.
MR The number of months until the next reset for an ARM
FRM = 1 if the mortgage is a fixed rate mortgage, = 0 otherwise
Low Doc = 1 if the loan was done with no or low documentation, = 0 otherwise
FICO FICO score, a credit score developed by Fair Isaac & Co. Scores range between
300 and 850, with higher scores indicating higher credit quality.
Low FICO = 1 if FICO is less than 620, = 0 otherwise
Medium FICO = 1 if FICO is between 620 and 700, = 0 otherwise
High FICO = 1 if FICO is above 700, = 0 otherwise
Original LTV Loan to value at origination
Multiple Liens = 1 if the borrower has other, junior mortgages, = 0 otherwise
Unemployment Monthly unemployment rate at the country level from BLS
PI ratio
Monthly Payments / Monthly Income. We impute income using debt-to-income
ratios.  Incomestays constant over time . Monthly Payments may vary over
time.
Loan Age The age of the loan in months
Local demographics Log population, mobility, per -capita income, the median age of householder,
average household size, % college educated, % black, % Hispanic
42Table 2: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample
Prepaid Defaulted Censored or All loans
paid to maturity
Loan-level variables
Mean Mean Mean Mean Std dev
FRM .268 .184 .463 .315 .465
Multiple Liens .093 .150 .176 .123 .328
Original L=V .766 .798 .747 .764 .139
(FICO score)/100 6.188 5.839 6.462 6.230 .736
Low FICO dummy .526 .717 .377 .504 .500
Med. FICO dummy .320 .238 .375 .327 .469
High FICO dummy .154 .045 .248 .169 .375
Low documentation .397 .354 .445 .407 .491
No. obs. 81,758 14,459 38,735 134,952
Time-dependent loan-level variables over all periods
log(V=L) .459 .338 .548 .481 .351
Mo. payment/income .316 .336 .271 .301 .124
Loan age in months 15.381 16.009 21.644 17.794 12.789
Mo. until next reset￿ 10.880 11.551 8.977 10.537 9.300
Exp_Bwd .120 .068 .061 .093 .100
Exp_HMS 1.069 1.059 1.145 1.096 .179
Exp_Fwd -.078 -.033 .049 -.0261 .130
Recent volatility of V 1.741 .985 1.442 1.556 1.458
IR .036 .044 -.004 .0212 .103
No. obs. 1,392,737 253,796 990,777 2,637,310
43Table 2: Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample, Continued
Prepaid Defaulted Censored or All loans
paid to maturity
Time-dependent loan-level variables, as last observed for each loan
Mean Mean Mean Mean Std dev
log(V=L) .524 .361 .457 .487 .393
Mo. payment/income .320 .345 .281 .312 .135
Loan age in months 19.653 20.070 28.837 22.334 14.091
Mo. until next reset￿ 13.952 14.234 13.060 13.743 10.533
Exp_Bwd .118 .055 -.0465 .064 .116
Exp_HMS 1.119 1.086 1.206 1.140 .187
Exp_Fwd -.045 .0006 .257 .047 .189
Recent volatility of V 1.888 1.033 1.235 1.609 1.404
IR .036 .048 .035 .037 .115
No. obs. 81,758 14,459 38,735 134,952
Zip-code￿ level demographics for each loan
Unemployment (%) 5.460 5.372 5.117 5.352 1.423
log(Population) 10.382 10.357 10.327 10.364 .692
Mobility .038 -.281 .025 -.0002 2.361
Per-cap. inc. ($K ) 22.478 20.768 22.382 22.267 9.667
Pct. college grad. .350 .326 .347 .347 .129
Pct. black .184 .289 .201 .200 .272
Pct. Hispanic .222 .160 .199 .209 .224
Med. Age of HHer 33.916 33.543 34.080 33.923 4.926
No. obs. 81,758 14,459 38,735 134,952
￿ Conditional on being an ARM. ￿Mobility￿is the year in which the average resident moved into her current house,
minus the nationwide average (1994.697, or August 1994).
44Table 3a: Bivariate Probit with Partial Observability using Exp_Bwd
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4




















































































































Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4



















































































Corr (ε1,ε2) -0.105 (0.046) -0.199 (0.054) -0.711 (0.091) -0.513 (0.061)
No. Obs 2625791 2623066 2472282 2439607
Log Likelihood -84645.18 -84233.20 -75917.13 -74276.22
Dependent Variable = No Default. No Default includes both continued payments and prepayments. No random effects.
Contents of each cell: estimated coefficient, standard error, marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by loan.









































































































































































































Demographics Yes Yes Yes
MSAFE Yes Yes Yes
Servicer FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Corr (ε1,ε2) -0.562 (0.069) -0.414 (0.159) 0.040 (0.066)
No. Obs 2100019 339588 1884019
Log Likelihood -68226.25 -5848.67 -70945.14
48Table 3b: Bivariate Probit with Partial Observability using Exp_HMS and Exp_Fwd
Spec 3: Exp_HMS Spec 4: Exp_HMS Spec 3: Exp_Fwd Spec 4: Exp_Fwd







































































































































Spec 3: Exp_HMS Spec 4: Exp_HMS Spec 3: Exp_Fwd Spec 4: Exp_Fwd













































































































Demographics No Yes Yes
MSAFE No Yes Yes
Servicer FE No Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes
Corr (ε1,ε2) -0.523 -0.328 (0.047) -0.563 (0.034) -0.449 (0.055)
No. Obs 2390450 2361564 2472282 2439607
Log Likelihood -73850.89 -72308.71 -75935.03 -74292.88
Dependent Variable = No Default. No Default includes both continued payments and prepayments. No random effects.
Contents of each cell: estimated coefficient, standard error, marginal effects. Standard errors are clustered by loan.
50Table 4: Bivariate Probit with Partial Observability with Random Effects
Spec 3: Exp_Bwd Spec 4: Exp_Bwd Spec 4: Exp_HMS Spec 4: Exp_Fwd

























































































































Spec 3: Exp_Bwd Spec 4: Exp_Bwd Spec 4: Exp_HMS Spec 4: Exp_Fwd
















































Demographics Yes Yes Yes
MSAFE Yes Yes Yes
Servicer FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes



















No. Obs 651770 651770 651770 651770
Log
Likelihood -18694.60 -18310.03 -17757.77 -18312.08
Dependent Variable = No Default. No Default includes both continued payments and prepayments. Contents of
each cell: estimated coefficient, standard error. Standard errors are clustered by loan. Due to the computational
burden, we use a ¼ random sample of loans for estimation of random effects models.
52Table 5: Marginal Effects (based on Table 3a)














) 0.351 24.22% 32.88% 44.63% 7.55%
Exp_Bwd 0.100 19.24% 21.16% 4.22%
Vol 1.458 14.29% 23.52% 2.77%
IR 0.103 -1.04% 0.06%
MR 10.607 7.25% 1.34%
FRM 1 26.98% 12.00%
Low Doc 1 -39.81% -42.26% -40.37% -48.54%
FICO/100 0.736 77.09% 86.19% 82.83% 79.90%
Original LTV 0.139 -21.52% -19.25% -16.76% -23.82%
Multiple Liens 1 -125.37% -125.35% -137.40% -127.25%
Unemployment 1.423 -10.09% -8.79% -6.43% -7.75%
PI ratio 0.124 -17.15%
PI ratio×
Low FICO 0.184 -26.93% -23.96% -21.62%
PI ratio×
Medium FICO 0.152 -26.43% -24.19% -23.61%
PI ratio×





This table reports marginal effects (relative to the hazard of default computed at the sample means
conditional on default) associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in each regressor. For binary
variables, it is a unit change instead of a one-standard-deviation change.












) 0.539 0.307 -0.233 55.84%
Exp_Bwd 0.123 0.023 -0.100 39.92%
Vol 2.111 1.118 -0.993 30.26%
IR -0.039 -0.003 0.036 0.68%
MR
* 13.255 16.417 3.162 -4.09%
FRM 0.288 0.242 -0.046 2.33%
Low Doc 0.515 0.434 -0.081 -6.21%
FICO/100 6.507 6.181 -0.327 69.57%
Original LTV 0.758 0.771 0.013 2.94%
Multiple Liens 0.169 0.242 0.073 19.01%
Unemployment 5.667 4.612 -1.055 -9.01%
PI ratio×
Low FICO 0.347 0.529 0.182 44.68%
PI ratio×
Medium FICO 0.369 0.362 -0.007 -2.14%
PI ratio×
High FICO 0.284 0.109 -0.175 -30.51%
This table reports how the difference in each regressor between 2004 - and  2006 vintage loans affects the
probability of default, relative to the empirical probability of default in a given month for 2004 vintage loans.
*conditional on being an ARM.
54Table 7: Univariate Probit






































































































































































































































































































Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA& Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Servicer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. Obs 2472282 2472282 2439607 2361564 2439607 1155760
Pseudo R
2 0.039 0.049 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.116
Log Likelihood -78436.70 -77574.53 -74001.62 -72001.58 -73993.16 -62708.54
Dependent Variable = No Default. Contents of each cell: estimated coefficient, standard error, marginal effects.
Standard errors are clustered by loan. For Specifications 1-5, No Default includes both continued payments and
prepayments. For Specification 6, No Default includes continued payments only.






















































































































































































Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4











































































































































(-2.5, 2.9, -4.8, -0.3)
SE (0.07, 0.21,
0.08, 0.21)
(-2.5, -2.5, -4.7, -5.5)
SE (0.10, 0.26,
0.11, 0.27)
(-4.1, -3.7, -6.4, -6.7)
SE (0.13, 0.32,
0.14, 0.33)
Pr. of Type 1 0.277 (0.004) 0.268 (0.004) 0.269 (0.004)
No. Loans 120394 120394 120394 120394
Log Likelihood -395027.48 - 385070.70 - 383670.32 - 382698.65
Contents of each cell: estimated coefficient, standard error, hazard ratio. Hazard ratios are exponentiated coefficients and have the
interpretation of hazard ratios for a one-unit change in X.
58Table A1: Univariate Probit with Quarterly Observations































































































































































































































































































































































Demographics Yes Yes Yes
MSA& Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Servicer FE Yes Yes Yes
No. Obs 867402 855887 838616 828452 867402 855887
Pseudo R
2 0.084 0.095 0.083 0.095 0.084 0.095
Log Likelihood -62174.55 -60675.65 -60444.25 -59023.47 -62173.76 -60666.19
Dependent Variable = No Default. Contents of each cell: estimated coefficient, standard error, marginal effects.
Quarters computed starting from month of initial observation for each loan (e.g., for a loan first appearing in the data
in 11/2007, the first quarter is 11/2007 – 01/2008.)  Right-hand-side variables are averages over quarters.
60